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Abstract:  
This paper reassesses the case for temporary emigration of unskilled workers as a 
solution to the child labor problem, based upon a general equilibrium model of migrant 
remittances, parental investment in child schooling, and intersectoral allocation of 
capital. Counterfactual simulations uncover a U-shape effect of temporary emigration on 
the incidence of child labor, suggesting that the case for temporary emigration as a 
solution to the child labor problem may be weak. 
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1. Introduction
Epstein and Kahana (2008) (hereafter E-K) advance the idea that encouraging temporary
emigration of unskilled workers can solve the child labor problem in developing countries.
Central to this intuitively compelling idea is the well-documented link between migration
and remittances (Docquier and Rapoport 2003). Arguably, as child labor is linked to
poverty (Basu and Van 1998), encouraging temporary emigration of the poorest section
of the working population indeed can, through remittances, combat child labor among
migrant households (Hanson and Woodru¤ 2003). But does it necessarily reduce the inci-
dence of child labor at the economy-wide level? E-K (2008) give an unequivocally a¢ rma-
tive answer to this question, arguing that such emigration has a non-negative e¤ect on the
earnings of non-migrant families. In this paper, we reassess this a¢ rmation by emphasizing
the implications of temporary emigration of adult workers for the intersectoral allocation
of capital in an environment where the law tolerates child labor.
Imagine an economy with two sectors that produce an identical good. One employs
(unskilled) adults only and the other, children only. To the extent that the aggregate
production function in each sector is Cobb-Douglas in capital and labor, and there is
perfect intersectoral mobility of capital, temporary emigration of adult workers may have
two opposite e¤ects on the adult workerswage. (Footnote: The same idea will go through
by substituting land for capital, as in an agrarian economy.) One is a positive e¤ect
working through the law of supply and demand. The other is a negative e¤ect caused by the
induced decline in the return to capital in the adult sector, and the subsequent reallocation
of capital from the adult labor sector to the child labor sector. We argue that the sum
of these two opposite e¤ects is key to understanding the nature of the relation between
temporary emigration of adult workers and the incidence of child labor in the source country
of migrants. Our general equilibrium model (outlined in section 2 below) links these two
phenomena in a context where households maximize utility through parental remittances
and child schooling decisions, and capitalists maximize the return to capital by balancing
between adult labor and child labor as the complementary input to capital. Counterfactual
simulations uncover a U-shape e¤ect of temporary emigration on the incidence of child
labor.
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2. The Setup
Consider a world with two economies. A poor economy (denoted asA) and a richer economy
(denoted as B). Economy A is initially populated by a continuum one of households
composed each of an unskilled adult (hereafter parent) and his child. In the beginning, all
parents from economy A enter a lottery pool whereby M 2 (0; 1) parents are randomly
drawn from the pool and rewarded with the right to emigrate to economy B, where they
will work and earn a wage !. A parent who loses the lottery stays and works in economy
A where he will earn a wage !a < !. Encouraging temporary emigration of economy As
adult workers thus amounts to increasing the level of M . Given our normalization of the
population size of economy A, M is also the exogenous probability that a parent will win
the emigration lottery.
2.1. Production
Production of the numeraire requires capital and land. Therefore in addition to households,
there is also a number k of (for simplicity) childless capitalists, each endowed with one unit
of capital. Thus k is both the number of capitalists and the total stock of capital available
in the economy. Capital hires labor in this environment, and it takes one unit of capital to
start a rm. A capitalist may start a rm that combines one unit of capital and adult labor
as production inputs (adult labor sector), or he may start a rm that combines capital and
child labor (child labor sector). There is perfect capital mobility across the two sectors.
Denote as ka the number of rms operating in the adult labor sector and as kc the number
of those operating in the child labor sector. By normalization, kh is also the total stock of
capital used in sector h 2 fa; cg. Output of the representative rm is ya = la in the adult
sector, and yc = lc in the child labor sector, where  2 (0; 1) is a productivity parameter,
and  2 (0; 1), the labor share.
Total labor supply is given by 1 M in the adult sector, and Lc in the child labor sector.
We interpret Lc as the economy-wide incidence of child labor. Labor use and intersectoral
capital allocation constraints respectively are:
(i) kclc  Lc; (ii) kala  1 M ; (iii) ka + kc = k:
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Under perfect competition, market-clearing wages for adult labor (!a) and child labor (!c)
are respectively
!a = 

ka
1 M
1 
(2.1)
!c = 

kc
Lc
1 
: (2.2)
As rms are owned by capitalists, a typical capitalist claims a residual a = ya !ala after
production if operating in sector a, and c = yc !clc if operating in sector c. Hence using
(2.1)-(2.2) yields the sector-dependent return to capital as follows:
c = (1  )
 Lc
kc

(2.3)
a = (1  )

1 M
k   kc

; (2.4)
where k   kc = ka.
As long as a > c, there is no child labor in this economy. Thus a necessary and
su¢ cient condition for child labor to emerge in this environment is that a  c. Perfect
mobility of capital across sector implies that in equilibrium, returns are equalized across
sectors: a = c. Substituting (2.3) and (2.4) into this equation, and re-arranging terms
thus yields the following equilibrium intersectoral allocation of capital:
kc =
1= Lc
1 M + 1= Lc
k ka =
1 M
1 M + 1= Lc
k (2.5)
Clearly, temporary emigration of parents causes a reallocation of capital from the adult
sector to the child labor sector: @kc=@M > 0 and @ka=@M < 0. Furthermore, from
(2.1)-(2.2), substituting in (2.5), yields wages as follows:
!a = 
 k
1 M + 1= Lc
1 
!c = 
1=
 k
1 M + 1= Lc
1 
: (2.6)
To ensure that it is in the best interest of all economy As parents to enter the temporary
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emigration lottery pool, we assume that
!  
 k
1 M
1 
(2.7)
which in turn implies that the inequality ! > !a always holds.
2.2. Households
A typical parent has preferences dened over own consumption of the numeraire good ca,
child consumption ck, and childs skill status j 2 fs; ug when adult. Denote as m 2 f0; 1g
an index operator that takes the value m = 1 if a parent wins the emigration lottery and
m = 0 if not. A child born in a household whose emigration lottery outcome is m and
who receives a level of education e becomes skilled (j = s) with conditional probability
Pr (s=e) = me; but with probability Pr (u=e) = 1   me he will remain unskilled as his
parent (j = u), where m 2 (0; 1). Given that parents in this environment are homogenous
in terms of parenting skills, we will assume that 1 = 0 = . The expected utility function
representing parental preferences is given by:
U = ln ca + 
24ln ck +  X
j2fs;ug
Pr (j=e)  (j)
35 (2.8)
where  (j) denotes parental valuation of the skill status j of his child when adult,  > 0
is the usual parental altruism parameter, and  2 (0; 1) the time discounting factor. For
simplicity we set  (s) = 1 and  (u) = 0, implying that each parent longs to raise a child
that will become skilled when adult. Since children do not emigrate in this environment,
they each receive a transfer  from their parent to help nance their consumption expenses.
This transfer is called remittance when it is made from an emigrant parent to his child left
behind.
A parents optimal choice of the households consumption plan, child transfer and
investment in childs education is made subject to the following constraints: (i) ca +  
R (m), (ii) ck  +(1  e)!c, where R (1) = ! and R (0) = !a, with Pr (m = 1) =M and
Pr (m = 0) = 1 M .
The decision problem faced by a typical parent whose emigration lottery outcome is
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m can thus be written as follows using budget constraints and (2.8): maxhe;i V (m; e; ),
where
V (m; e; ) = ln [R (m)  ] +  [ln ( + (1  e)!c) + e] : (2.9)
At a cost of straightforward calculus, we obtain the following Lemma:
Lemma 1. Suppose that ,
1 <
(1 + )1=

< 1 + 1=; (2.10)

 k
1 M
1 
 !  (1 + )
1=

 k
1 M + 1=
1 
: (2.11)
Then, the optimal choice of (e; ) is given as follows:
em = 1 +
R (m)
!c
  (1 + ) () 1 ; m = R (m)  () 1 !c: (2.12)
Since R (1) > R (0), children from migrant households always receive more education
(Hansen and Woodru¤ 2003). Conditions (2.10) and (2.11) ensure that em 2 (0; 1), for all
m 2 f0; 1g. These conditions are useful for comparative statics exercises. Given Lemma
1, the economy-wide incidence of child labor can thus be given as follows, using the law of
large numbers: Lc = (1 M) (1  e0) + (1  e1)M . Using (2.1), (2.2), (2.5), and (2.12)
yields Lc as follows
Lc =
1 + 

  1 M
1=
  !
1=
 
1 M + 1= Lc
k
!1 
M: (2.13)
2.3. Equilibrium Analysis
Observe that ka, kc, a, and c are written as functions of the incidence of child labor Lc.
This implies that proving the existence of a general equilibrium for economy A amounts
to determining Lc. Therefore:
Denition 1. A general equilibrium for economy A is an incidence of child labor Lc, such
that Lc solves (2.13).
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Given conditions (2.10) and (2.11), equation (2.13) can be shown to be a well-dened
xed-point problem. Therefore Brouwer Fixed Point theorem may be applied to establish
the existence of a unique solution to (2.13).
To characterize this solution, dene
 
 
Lc;M; !
  Lc   1 + 

+  1= +
24 1 M + 1= Lc
k
!1 
!   
35 M
1=
;
so that equation (2.13) becomes  
 
Lc;M; !

= 0. The unique solution Lc to this equa-
tion can be characterized implicitly as follows by applying the Implicit Function theorem:
dLc=dM =   M= L, where  L and  M are partial derivatives of  . At the cost of straight-
forward calculus, it can be shown that  L > 0. Clearly then, the e¤ect of temporary emi-
gration (i.e., an exogenous increase inM) depends on the sign of  M , which, unfortunately,
is ambiguous. We therefore have no choice but to resort to a numerical simulation to assess
this e¤ect. Parameters values for this simulation are chosen such that conditions (2.10)
and (2.11) underlying Lemma 1 are simultaneously satised:
Table: Parameters values
   !  k
0.96 0.70 0.75 0.80 0.66 1
Figures 1 and 2 below summarize our simulation exercises. Encouraging temporary em-
igration of unskilled workers (i.e., a rise in M) has a U-shape e¤ect on the incidence of
child labor as both gures show. Fig. 1 controls for the e¤ect of child labor productivity
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, while Fig. 2 shows a U-shape e¤ect for  = :45.
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Fig.1: Incidence of Child Labor by f and M
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Fig.2: Incidence of Child Labor, f=0.45
3. Concluding Remarks
Using a general equilibrium model of migrant remittances, parental investment in child
schooling, and intersectoral allocation of capital, we reassess the case for temporary em-
igration of unskilled workers as a solution to the child labor problem. A counterfactual
simulation of this model reveals a U-shape e¤ect of temporary emigration on the incidence
of child labor: encouraging temporary emigration of unskilled workers initially reduces the
incidence of child labor as shown in both graphs above. However, as the ow of emigrants
becomes increasingly large, such policy becomes counter-productive. The driving force of
this U-shape e¤ect is the complementarity between labor and capital (or land), and the
intersectoral perfect mobility of capital (or land). Our results suggest that policymakers
and development experts should exercise caution in advocating temporary emigration of
unskilled workers as the solution to the child labor problem.
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